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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the future labor market prospects of youth in light of demographic trends and projections. The relationship between demography and the youth labor market is reviewed, and explanations for the persistent differential labor market status of white and nonwhite youth are analyzed. The paper concludes by proposing a set of policy initiatives designed to alleviate the disproportionate amount of labor market distress borne by New York City minority youth. Among the major findings are: (1) Projected declines in the absolute number of youth do not necessarily employ improved future labor market circumstances for minority youth. (2) Nationally, the number of nonwhite youth will decline much slower than the number of white youth, and in New York City, the proportion of nonwhite working-age teens and young adults will grow markedly over the next decade and a half. (3) Over the last fifteen years, the nation's youth unemployment problem has increasingly become a minority, particularly black, problem. (4) The rise in the minimum wage does not account for the rise in black youth unemployment--in fact, relative to private sector wages, the minimum wage has fallen. (5) Youth employment policy must recognize the varying needs and heterogeneity of the population in need. A 49-item reference list is appended. (KH)

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Demographic Trends and Youth Employment Policy: A Look to the Year 2000

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Summary

This paper discusses the future labor market prospects of youth in light of demographic trends and projections. It reviews the relationship between demography and the youth labor market, and analyzes explanations for the persistent differential labor market status of white and nonwhite youth. The paper concludes by proposing a set of policy initiatives designed to alleviate the disproportionate amount of labor market distress borne by New York City minority youth. Among its principal findings are:

* Contrary to conventional widsom, projected declines in the absolute number of youth and their relative share of the population do not necessarily imply improved future labor market circumstances for minority youth. This pertains to conditions in New York City and the nation.

* Nationally, the number of nonwhite youth will decline much slower than the number of white youth; and in New York City, the proportion of nonwhite working-age teens and young adults will grow markedly over the next decade and a half. Blacks will comprise an increasingly smaller proportion of the nonwhite population in the future.

* Over the past decade and a half, the nation's youth unemployment problem has increasingly become a minority, particularly black, youth unemployment problem--characterized by extemely high unemployment among black and other nonwhite youth relative to their white counterparts. In New York City, black unemployment rates are 2.5 times those of white youth, and have not fallen despite an unprecedented period of local job growth. Recent research suggests that job competition in New York City between blacks and more recent immigrant groups such as Asians and non-Puerto Rican Hispanics is likely to increase.

* The rise in the minimum wage does not account for the rise in black youth unemployment over the past 15 years. In fact, relative to private sector wages, the minimum wage has fallen. In 1970, the minimum wage was 50 percent of average private sector wages, by 1983 it was only 42 percent of private sector wages. In addition to having no positive effect on minority youth unemployment, a youth sub-minimum wage is likely to displace older workers, and is therefore an unsound policy alternative.

* Youth employment policy must recognize the varying needs and heterogeneity of the population in need. Although a variety of programs exist in New York City, it is not at all clear that a comprehensive strategy has been devised. Such a strategy would coordinate the following efforts: increasing the number of decent entry-level jobs to which minority youth would have access; implementing links between the upgrading of deficient basic skills and part-time employment during the school year and summer; dropout prevention, especially among the economically disadvantaged; applying pressure on the public school system to adequately prepare students; legislating linkages between local economic development policy and youth employment initiatives; improving the employment situtation for the city's minority adults; and reaffirming our strong commitment to and enforcement of anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies.

I. DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE YOUTH LABOR MARKET

The Baby Boom and the Youth Employment Dilemma

Much of the current understanding and conventional wisdom regarding the youth unemployment problem in the United States is informed by, and in many cases based solely upon, demographic trends and their influence on the youth labor market. Demography's influence has prompted many analysts to conclude that the projected decline in the number of white youth will improve the future labor market circumstances of all youth. Such a conclusion ignores two important considerations: 1) the number of nonwhite youth will not fall in the future; and 2) the projected decline of the young white population is not likely to result in improved labor market circumstances for nonwhite youth.

Estimates of the absolute size of the youth population and their share of the civilian labor force are assumed to provide a reasonable first approximation of future labor market success. Generally speaking, the smaller the cohort, the more advantageous its labor market position. All other things held constant, larger cohorts, relative to their predecessors, are at a distinct labor market disadvantage. When preceded by smaller groups, members of large cohorts are forced to compete more intensely against one another for jobs; when following another large cohort, there is unavoidable competition with members of the preceding group as well. Cohort size is also likely to influence decisions having to do with completing or going beyond compulsory education, military service and/or occupational choices.

Whether the most relevant variable effecting the labor market outcomes of youth is the absolute size of the youth population or its relative share of the civilian labor force is a matter of interpretation. Traditional economic analysis assumes that most young people and most adults are close substitutes in the labor market, and, therefore, changes in the relative size of the youth

labor force result in changes in their wage rates relative to the wage rates of other age groups. If youth wage rates do not adjust as expected, one would still anticipate changes in youth unemployment rates relative to adult joblessness. In either case, the key variable is the youth share of the civilian labor force. By contrast, institutionalist-driven labor market analyses posit the existence of labor market segments, the most relevant in this particular case being an urban youth labor market to which all young jobseekers are "confined." Very few adults compete directly with young urban labor force participants according to this view. By rejecting the perfect substitutability assumption made in the more traditional analysis, the youth labor market/segmentation approach emphasizes the absolute size of the youth population as well as its relative share.

Most interpretations of the relatively difficult labor market conditions facing young people in the 1960's and 1970's refer to the postwar baby boom. In 1947, new births reached a 3.8 million per year high, surpassed only by a 4.5 million per year peak registered from 1958 to 1962. Demographers have attributed the first surge to an increase in the number of first-born children, and the latter boom to an increase in the number of third- and fourth-born. The tremendous increase in both the absolute size of the youth population and their relative share of the civilian labor force resulted in persistently high youth unemployment rates beginning in the early nineteen sixties and carrying into the seventies. Youth unemployment rates have always been higher than adult rates in the U.S., but the disadvantageous labor market position of youth was exacerbated by the increase in the labor force participation rates of adult women which began in the late nineteen sixties. High youth unemployment rates became associated with an upward pressure on the aggregate

unemployment rate as well. It is this picture of demographically-determined labor market dynamics that will undoubtedly inform all future speculations about youth labor market conditions.

Future Demographic Trends and Youth Labor Market Conditions

National and local population projections for the next two and a half decades indicate that the number of young people will grow more slowly, relative to previous postwar years, and that young people will comprise a relatively smaller share of the population. According to published Census Bureau figures, 15 to 24 year olds comprised 18.7 percent of the total population in 1980, with estimates of 18.0 percent in 1982. The projections for 1990, 1995 and the year 2000 are 14.2, 13.1, and 13.5 percent respectively. Even though the projections indicate a slight growth in the proportion of 15-24 year olds between 1995 and 2000, the youth share of the population at the beginning of the next century is still projected to be well below that of 1980 (Bureau of the Census, 1984) (see Table 1).

Similar demographic trends characterize future conditions in New York City. In 1970, the number of New York City residents under the age of 18 peaked at 2,235,000. However, over the past decade the size of the youth population has declined considerably and steadily relative to other age cohorts. According the Department of City Planning, "From 1970 to 1980 the rate of decline of persons under the age of 18 was twice that of the total population" (1983, p. 1). Projections of New York City's young population indicate a decline from 1.8 to 1.6 million from 1980 to 1990, with the 10 to 17 year old age group projected to contract by approximately 200,000. The chief assumptions underlying these projections are a decline in the birth rate

Table 1

ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF THE PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNITED STATES POPULATION, BY AGE: 1950 to 2000

Year	Total Population	Age 14-17	Age 18-24
Estimates			
1950	100.0	5.5	10.6
1960	100.0	6.2	8.9
1965	100.0	7.3	10.4
1970	100.0	7.8	12.1
1975	100.0	7.9	13.0
1980	100.0	7.1	13.3
1982	100.0	6.4	13.1
Projections*			
1985	100.0	6.2	12.0
1990	100.0	5.2	10.4
1995	100.0	5.5	9.3
2000	100.0	5.7	9.4

* From the Census Bureau's "Middle Series" population projections.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population of the U.S., By Age, Sex, and Race: 1983-2080, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 952, Table F, May, 1984, page 8.

from 1980 to 1990 relative to the 1970's, and "net migration outward...no more than that experienced from 1970 to 1980, and [possibly] as little as half the 1970 to 1980 level" (Department of City Planning 1983, p. 2). Population projections by age developed by the New York State Department of Commerce and the National Planning Association also indicate that young people in New York City will comprise an increasingly smaller share of the city's population over the next decade and a half (see Table 2).

Labor force projections published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) show that the total and youth labor forces will grow more slowly over the next decade relative to the past ten years. The size of the youth labor force will shrink over the projected period, and 16 to 24 year olds will make up only 16 percent of the civilian labor force in 1995, compared to almost 24 percent in 1980 (see Tables 3 and 4).

A cursory glance at population and labor force projections, given a demographically-driven analysis of labor markets, seems to suggest that relative to conditions in the 1960s and 1970s, youth labor market conditions are likely to improve over the next fifteen years. The previous emphasis on future demographic trends clearly suggests that the cohort of young people reaching labor market entry age at the end of this century will be significantly smaller than previous cohorts. Other things remaining the same, and compared to the labor market circumstances of youth between 1965 and 1980, the new cohort's future labor market prospects could easily be construed as positive.

The Importance of Race and Ethnicity

However, careful consideration of race and ethnicity when analyzing national and local population projections to the year 2000 and the particular

Table 2

PROJECTIONS OF NEW YORK CITY'S POPULATION,
BY AGE, 1990, 2000
(numbers in thousands)

	1990			2000	
	NYS COMM[1]	NPA[2]	CSS[3]	NYS COMM	NPA
Total, NYC	7,180.3	6,916.0	6,951.0	7,260.6	6,640.0
15-19	444.5	400.4	347.0	439.1	454.5
20-24	541.0	534.3	498.0	481.0	399.7
15-24	985.5	934.7	854.0	920.1	854.2
	As a Percent of New York City's Total Population				
Total, NYC	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
15-19	6.2	5.8	5.0	6.0	6.8
20-24	7.4	7.7	7.2	6.6	6.0
15-24	13.7	13.5	12.2	12.7	12.9

	Percent Change 1990-2000	
	COMMERCE	NPA
Total, NYC	+1.1	-4.0
15-19	-1.2	+13.5
20-24	-11.1	-25.2
15-24	-6.6	-8.6

1 New York State Department of Commerce
2 National Planning Association
3 Community Service Society

Sources: New York State Department of Commerce, Official Population Projections for New York State Counties: 1980 to 2010, April 1985; T. Sivia and N. Terleckyi, U.S. Economic Growth: Regional Projections, 1984-2000, National Planning Association, 1983; E. Tobier, The Changing Face of Poverty. Trends in New York City's Population in Poverty: 1960-1990, Community Service Society, October 1984.

Table 3

NATIONAL LABOR FORCE GROWTH, 1950-1982
AND PROJECTED GROWTH, 1983-1995
(Average Annual Rates)

Age	Percent Change				
	1950-60	1960-70	1970-82	1982-90	1990-95
16 and over	1.3	1.7	2.4	1.6	1.0
16 to 24	0.0	4.5	2.7	-1.3	-0.8
25 to 54	1.3	1.0	2.3	2.9	1.6
55 and over	1.6	1.4	0.3	-0.7	-0.2

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Projections for 1995, Bulletin 2197, March 1984, page 2.

Table 4

U.S. CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE, 1970-1982
AND PROJECTED* TO 1990 AND 1995

	1970	1980	1982	1990	1995
Total 16+	82,771	106,940	110,204	124,951	131,387
16-19	7,249	9,380	8,526	7,901	7,804
20-24	10,597	15,922	16,081	14,186	13,326
16-24	17,846	25,302	24,607	22,087	21,130
	Percent Distribution				
Total 16+	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
16-19	8.8	8.8	7.7	6.3	5.9
20-24	12.8	14.9	14.6	11.4	10.1
16-24	21.6	23.7	22.3	17.7	16.1

* Based on the Census Bureau's "Middle Series" population projections.

Source: Calculated from Table 1 in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Projections for 1995, Bulletin 2197, March 1984, page 3.

labor market experiences of black youth significantly dampens optimistic views of youth labor market conditions over the next decade and a half. This is particularly true with respect to the labor market prospects of nonwhite youth in New York City.

According to Census Bureau calculations, the nonwhite population is projected to grow at a rate much faster than the rest of the nation. Over the next several decades the proportion of the total population that is black-and-other races will increase steadily (see Table 5). The Census Bureau has concluded that "in the future the white population never increases more than about 40 percent as rapidly as does the black-and-other races population" (1984, p. 9). The number of births by black-and-other races is currently 725,000, an all time high, and not much of a decline is projected for the 1990s because the number of women of childbearing age in that group continues to increase.

Although black Americans will comprise an increasingly smaller proportion of the black-and-other races in the future, the black population will continue to grow at a rate greater than that of whites (see Table 6). Between 1990 and 2000 the black population is projected to grow at a rate that is 2.5 times that of whites, and almost twice that of the nation. The total black fertility rates* for 1983 and projected for 1990 are 2,286 and 2,345 births per 1000 women, respectively. The comparable figures for white females are 1,763 and 1,872 births per 1000 women. These differential rates of population growth

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* The total fertility rate indicates the number of children that women would have in their lifetime if, at each year of age, they experienced the age-specific birth rates occurring in a specified year. For a more detailed explanation, see Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population of the United States by Age, Sex, and Race: 1983 to 2080. Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 952, pp. 130-132.

Table 5

PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION THAT IS
BLACK AND OTHER RACES

Estimates:	
1950	10.7
1960	11.4
1970	12.4
1980	14.1
Projections:	
1990	15.6
2000	16.9
2080	25.5

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population of the U.S. by Age, Sex and Race: 1983 to 2080, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 952, Table H, May 1984, page 10.

Table 6

PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATION, BY AGE AND RACE,
FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1990, 1995, 2000*
(numbers in thousands)

				Percent Change		
	1990	1995	2000	1990-1995	1995-2000	1990-2000
l Ages						
tal	249,657	259,559	267,955	+3.9	+3.2	+7.3
White	210,790	217,412	222,6564	+3.1	+2.4	+5.6
Black	31,412	33,651	35,753	+7.1	+6.2	+13.8
to 19 years						
tal	16,968	16,968	18,943	0	+11.6	+11.6
White	13,840	13,794	15,113	-0.3	+9.5	+9.2
Black	2,546	2,538	3,114	-0.3	+22.7	+22.3
to 24 years						
tal	18,580	17,142	17,145	-7.7	0	-7.7
White	15,270	13,933	13,889	-8.6	-0.3	-9.0
Black	2,720	2,565	2,558	-5.7	-0.3	-6.0
to 24 years						
tal	37,548	34,110	36,088	-9.2	+5.8	-3.9
White	29,110	27,727	29,002	-4.8	+4.6	-0.4
Black	5,260	5,103	5,672	-3.1	+11.2	+7.7

ncludes Armed Forces overseas; as of July 1st in each year.

urce: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population of the U.S., By Age, Sex and Race: 1983-2080, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 952, Table 6, May 1984, pp. 53-73.

and fertility imply the following for the future black youth population: the number of black youths between the ages of 15 to 24 will increase 7.7 percent between 1990 and 2000, while the size of the white population between the ages of 15 and 24 will fall by .4 percent, and in the nation as a whole that age-group will decline by almost 4 percent.

All available New York City population projections by age indicate that the number of working-age teenagers and young adults is likely to decline in both absolute terms and as a percentage of the city's total population. Closer examination of the racial and ethnic composition of that cohort reveals that at the same time the city's future population becomes older, the proportion of its younger population that is nonwhite will grow. Figures from Tobier's (1984) Community Service Society report on poverty in New York City quantify this projection most clearly (see Table 7). According to Tobier's calculations, the number of New York City's 16 to 24 years olds is projected to decline 20 percent from the 1980 level of just above one million to 845,000 in 1990. However, the percentage decline among white non-Hispanics in that age group is projected to be twice (-40 percent) that of the overall rate during the same ten year period. The comparable percentage changes for black non-Hispanics and all Hispanics are -9.6 and -4.7 percent respectively. Only other nonwhites are expected to increase their numbers from 1980 to 1990. With respect to the youth share of New York City's population, Tobier's figures show that in 1970 white non-Hispanics comprised 60 percent of all 16 to 24 year olds. By 1980 that proportion had fallen to 44 percent, and the projected 1990 share is 33 percent, almost one-half the proportion twenty years earlier. The black non-Hispanic and all Hispanic shares of the total 16 to 24 year old population are projected to grow much more slowly between 1980 and 1990, relative to the previous decade. By contrast, other nonwhite 16 to

Table 7

YOUTH POPULATION TRENDS IN NEW YORK CITY,
BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 1970, 1980 and 1990*
(numbers in thousands)

	1970	1980	1990
All 16 to 24 year olds	1,132	1,058	845
White Non-Hispanics	680 (60)	461 (44)	276 (33)
Black Non-Hispanics	229 (20)	291 (27)	263 (31)
Other Non-Whites	29 (3)	50 (5)	64 (8)
All Hispanics	194 (17)	255 (24)	243 (28)

	Percent Change		
	1970-80	1980-90	1970-90
All 16 to 24 year olds	-6.5	-20.1	-25.4
White Non-Hispanics	-32.2	-40.1	-59.4
Black Non-Hispanics	+27.1	-9.6	+14.8
Other Non-Whites	+72.4	+28.0	+120.7
All Hispanics	+31.4	-4.7	+25.3

*Numbers in parentheses are percentages of all 16 to 24 year olds.

Source: E. Tobier, The Changing Face of Poverty. Trends in New York City's Population in Poverty: 1960-1990. Community Service Society of New York, October 1984, Appendix table 2, pp. 124-127.

24 year olds are projected to increase their share by over 60 percent between 1980 and 1990. The NPA's projections of New York City's population by age also suggest that nonwhites will comprise a larger share of the younger age groups in 1990 (see McGahey 1985).

Both sources clearly indicate that the most salient characteristic of New York City's future pool of young labor force participants will be its nonwhite majority.

Similar trends have been projected with respect to the future composition of the nation's labor force. The nonwhite contribution to the growth of the labor force has been increasing steadily since the 1960's, "despite the continuing drop in participation by black men" (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1984). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, "the black labor force is projected to grow at almost twice the white rate, reflecting the younger age structure of the black population" (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1984). Due to future differential rates of growth, blacks will account for 21 and 28 percent of the additions to the country's labor force during the 1982-1990 and 1990-1995 periods, respectively (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1984). The race-specific population projections for the nation and New York City, and the above labor force projections suggest that young nonwhite and black labor market entrants are not likely to profit from the projected decrease of the 16 to 24 year old cohort in the year 2000.

The Future Supply of Black Youth in the Labor Market

If, as the figures suggest, the black "baby boom" began a few years later than the nation's, then we would expect that the relative increase of potential young black labor market entrants would, in effect, result in

Table 8

U.S. LABOR FORCE GROWTH, BY RACE, 1950-1982
AND PROJECTED GROWTH, 1982-1995
(Average Annual Rates)

	Percent Change				
	1950-60	1960-70	1970-82	1982-90	1990-95
Total Labor Force	1.3	1.7	2.4	1.6	1.0
Black and other	--	1.8	3.6	2.6	2.0
Blacks	--	--	--	2.3	1.8

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Projections for 1995, Bulletin 2191, March 1984.

continued labor market distress at least through the 1990s. Future adverse labor market conditions will likely be characterized by persistent, if not growing, socioeconomic disparities between black and white youth reflected most starkly by high black youth unemployment rates, low earnings, employment-to-population ratios and labor force participation rates, and the continued possibility of a restricted choice of jobs due to employment discrimination. In addition to the net effect of demographic trends, the labor market position of black youth might also influenced by other supply-side influences, such as: secondary and postsecondary school enrollment trends; the enlistment of black youths in the volunteer armed forces; black student labor force participation rates as compared to rates of white students; and the degree of black youth nonparticipation in the labor market or in school. In the absence of any presumed or speculated offsetting demand-side factors,* one can safely conclude that black youth are likely to suffer disproportionately in the future.

However, it is at least arguable that some of these supply-side factors could induce a slowing of the anticipated increase in the number of future young black labor market entrants, which would presumably improve the employment opportunities of the new cohort, all other things being equal. For example, the voluntary armed services might act as, or simply be interpreted as, a "safety valve" which might be chosen by a significant number of young blacks as an alternative to civilian labor force participation. A recent study indicates that blacks are increasing their share in the armed forces. In fact, the proportion of blacks in the armed forces is greater than black

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* This is especially important as far as New York City is concerned, given the projected slow job growth in the future (see McGahey 1985).

representation in the civilian labor force (Leon 1984). The author notes that "the proportion of black men in the armed forces is twice that among civilian workers, and the ratio is even a bit higher for black women" (Leon 1984, p. 5). Conventional wisdom has construed the armed forces as a temporary alternative to the civilian labor force, a mere "transition between school and civilian jobs" (Leon 1984, p. 5). The 1980 National Longitudinal Study (NLS) of high school seniors "suggests that the usual view of military service as a transitory rather than a permanent career-oriented job may not be relevant for most youths" (Leon 1984, p. 5). Although the NLS considers that finding "trivial," research conducted at Ohio State University's Center for Human Resource Research concludes that "blacks who complete their first enlistment are more likely than other racial groups to re-enlist" (Leon 1984, p. 5).

Richard Cooper attributes the increasing share of blacks in the armed forces since the mid-1960s to these factors:

> . . . (1) a dramatic increase over time in the proportion of blacks found eligible for military service; (2) particularly high unemployment rates that plagued the young black population during the beginning of the volunteer force; and (3) a lag in the earning potential for young blacks in the civilian labor force (1977, p. 210).

Therefore, a significant reduction of future labor market distress among black youth brought about by an increasing share of black enlistees in the armed forces is not likely, especially given the current existence of an increasing share of blacks in the armed forces along with persistent and chronically high black youth unemployment over the past decade. Leon summarizes the effect of the all-volunteer military as follows:

> The civilian employment situation for black youth has not improved since the start of the all-volunteer military--in fact, the jobless rate for 18- and 19-year olds rose from about 28 percent in 1973 to nearly 48 percent in 1982...

> During economic downturns, more blacks than whites enter the military from outside the labor force rather than from the ranks of the unemployed. Many of the blacks outside the labor force had not sought jobs in the civilian economy because of the poor employment situation they faced. Thus, the continually high jobless rates for young blacks directly contributed to their military enlistments during recent years (1984, p. 5).

If future school enrollment results in a lower labor force participation rate for black students, then one might expect that trend to constitute a second possible source of curbing the anticipated increase in young black labor force participants. It is important to note, however, that such a lowering of labor force participation among black students may very well be evidence of poor labor market opportunities for black youth rather than a constructive withholding of labor. Existing evidence reveals:

> A drop in black youth employment might be a disguised blessing if it were tied to higher school attendance. But this is not the case. Ellwood and Wise (1983) show that employment rates for black males both in and out of school declined during the 1970s, while enrollment and employment patterns for black women hardly changed at all during the decade. Osterman (1980) attributed some effects on employment to school enrollment, but the effects do not explain a substantial part of the employment gap between blacks and whites (McGahey and Jeffries 1985 p. 16).

Similarly, one might interpret higher rates of non-participation in the labor force or school among young blacks as a positive development, to the extent that this lack of participation slowed the future growth of the black youth labor force. However, to the extent that this "relief" from an oversupply of black youth in the labor force is associated with disadvantaged labor market conditions, it must be regarded as part of the problem rather than an element of the solution.

II. YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE

A re-examination of labor market status indicators by race over the postwar period, especially over the past decade and a half, reveals "something that is too often forgotten": the youth unemployment problem in the United States has increasingly become a minority, particularly black, youth unemployment problem (Freeman and Holzer 1985). Over the past two decades the gap between nonwhite and white unemployment rates has not only grown considerably, but the differentials have been particularly resistant to regional and national economic expansions and federal policy initiatives aimed at racial discrimination in the labor market. As Freeman and Holzer succinctly state: "The well publicized youth unemployment problem, then, has taken the form not so much of joblessness among white youths as of high joblessness among black youths" (1985, pp. 18-19). The experiences of black and other minority youth in New York City over the past fifteen years epitomizes this accurate re-definition of the youth unemployment problem.*

Comparisons of black and white labor market experiences which account for differences in age, school enrollment and educational attainment illustrate the chronic employment problems of black youth relative to their white counterparts. For example, the ratio of black to white youth unemployment rates has grown steadily over the past thirty years (see Table 9). In 1954, the unemployment rates for black and white youths were virtually the same. By the end of the 1960's, black youth unemployment rates were twice those of

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* Although much of the research cited in this paper refers to the disparities between black and white youth, the general theme and intent is to document and understand the reasons for the differential labor market status of white versus black, Hispanic, and other nonwhite youth.

Table 9

BLACK/WHITE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE RATIOS,
1954-1983

Age	1954	1964	1969	1977	1983
16 to 17	.96	1.6	2.0	2.2	2.1
18 to 19	1.1	1.7	2.4	2.8	2.3
20 to 24	1.7	1.7	1.8	2.3	2.0

Source: Calculated from Freeman and Holzer (1985), Table I, page 19.

whites, and in 1977 the black to white ratio for 18-19 year olds was just under 3 to 1. During the economic recovery in 1983, the ratio of black/white unemployment for all youth under 24 years of age remained at a minimum of 2 to 1.

Perhaps even more disconcerting are comparisons of black and white employment-to-population ratios by age. Many analysts consider these comparisons of the proportion of the population that is employed "a more direct and better measure of the 'employment problem,' because it reflects not only high unemployment but also the low labor force participation rate of black youths--i.e., the high number who report themselves no longer looking for work and are therefore not counted in official unemployment statistics" (Freeman and Holzer, 1985, p. 19). In addition to drastically lower black employment-to-population ratios, the percentage of black youths employed has declined steadily since the early 1960's (see Table 10).

Recently published data from the Current Population Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1983) reveal that black youth who are enrolled in school face considerably less favorable labor market conditions than whites. In October of 1982, the national unemployment rate for all 16 to 24 year old school enrollees was 16.7 percent. The comparable figures for white and black enrollees were 14.7 and 36.9 percent, respectively. Among those not enrolled in school, the recorded rates were 15.7 percent for white youth and 38.6 percent for blacks. These data also show that the unemployment rate of black high school graduates was 53.0 percent in October of 1982, compared to a 19.0 percent rate for whites. Among those not enrolled in college, the unemployment rates for black and white 16 to 24 year olds were 58.0 and 21.4 percent respectively. And among those youths that dropped out of high school,

Table 10

EMPLOYMENT-TO-POPULATION RATIOS,
1954-1983

	1954	1964	1969	1977	1983
16 to 17 years old					
Black and other	40.4	27.6	28.4	18.9	13.7
White	40.6	36.5	42.7	44.3	36.2
18 to 19 years old					
Black and other	66.5	51.8	51.1	36.9	31.3
White	61.3	57.7	61.8	65.2	58.0
20 to 24 years old					
Black and other	75.9	78.1	77.3	61.2	57.2
White	77.9	79.3	78.8	80.5	74.2

Source: Freeman and Holzer (1985), Table I, page 19.

between 1980 and 1981, whites were jobless at a rate of 29.2 percent, while the figure for blacks reached an astonishing level of 71.4 percent.

Although New York City labor force data by race and age cohort must be interpreted with caution and are not readily available, recent employment and unemployment data for New York City also indicate that whites experience more success in the labor market relative to nonwhites. The city's black-to-white unemployment rate ratio stood at 1.5 in 1980--1.7 for men and 1.1 for women. By 1984, following a period of unprecedented private sector job growth in the New York City labor market area, the overall ratio had increased to 2.1, with the male and female ratios rising to 2.5 and 1.6 respectively. White unemployment rates declined by .2 percentage points on average during the five-year span, while the average change in joblessness among blacks was an increase of 3.7 percentage points over the same period (see table 11). In 1981, the unemployment rate among 16 to 19 year old nonwhite males was 56.6 percent compared to a 25.1 percent rate among whites the same age. The comparable figures for female teenagers that year were 48.9 percent for nonwhites and 20.3 for whites (Tapper 1983). Unpublished figures compiled by the New York State Department of Labor documenting the labor market status of 16 to 19 year olds show that in 1984 the unemployment rate for black teenagers was 55.8 percent--2.4 times that of whites; the Hispanic to white unemployment ratio reached 1.3 (see table 12). While joblessness among all other teenagers has declined steadily since 1982, the unemployment rate for black youths in New York City rose by 5.4 percent.

The proportion of black and Hispanic New York City teenagers not in the labor force has been twice that of white teens in recent years (see Table 13). In general, blacks have not benefitted from New York City's publically

Table 11

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN THE NEW YORK CITY LABOR MARKET AREA,
BY RACE AND SEX, 1980 and 1984

	1980	1984	Percent Change
Whites	6.7	6.5	-3.0
Men	6.4	5.9	-7.8
Women	6.7	7.2	+7.5
Blacks	9.8	13.6	+38.8
Men	11.0	14.5	+31.8
Women	7.6	12.6	+65.8

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, 1980 and 1984.

Table 12

ANNUAL AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR 16 TO 19 YEAR OLDS
IN NEW YORK CITY, 1982-1984

	1982	1983	1984
All 16 to 19 year olds	N.A.	33.0	29.6
Whites	27.2	26.0	21.0
Blacks	48.2	49.7	50.8
Hispanics	43.5	39.4	27.6

Source: Unpublished data compiled by the New York State Department of Labor.

Table 13

NUMBER NOT IN THE LABOR FORCE, BY AGE AND RACE,
1983 AND 1984 ANNUAL AVERAGES, IN THOUSANDS

	1983	1984
All Persons	2,582	2,587
Percentage 16 to 19	13.9	13.3
All White Persons	1,855	1,812
Percentage 16 to 19	10.8	10.6
All Black Persons	661	670
Percentage 16 to 19	21.0	20.4
All Hispanic Persons	565	568
Percentage 16 to 19	20.0	17.8

Source: New York State Department of Labor, Division of Research and Statistics, Bureau of Labor Market Information, Annual Labor Area Report: New York City Fiscal Year 1986 BLMI Report No. 43, p. 21, Table 11.

heralded economic recovery (Stafford 1985). In addition, those industries which grew rapidly between 1970 and 1980 are currently changing their business practices in ways which have effectively "reduced their demand for part-time youth...[t]hus teenage representation in these growing sectors fell dramatically over the decade" (Bailey and Waldinger, 1984).

Black Youth Unemployment: Consensus and Continued Controversy

As the data indicate, there is substantial evidence which suggests that the youth employment problem in the U.S. is disproportionately concentrated among black youth. Discerning exactly why that has been the case, particularly over the past two decades, continues to be the subject of considerable debate. The consensus is that there is no single cause. Frequently articulated explanations of the severity of black youth joblessness include: a skills mismatch; poor attitudes towards work; poor or inadequate information about how to conduct a job search; inadequate or inaccurate information regarding where jobs are located; slow macroeconomic growth; rising aggregate unemployment rates in the 1970s; increasing labor market competition from legal and illegal immigrants and adult women; the "segmentation" of the U.S. labor market; upward pressure on the black youth wage rate from Federal interventions such as the minimum wage, affirmative action, and equal employment opportunity policies; racial discrimination; and the exodus of jobs from central cities. That each of these factors contributes to the labor market problems of black youth is generally agreed upon. However, there is considerable disagreement regarding the degree to which any single factor or combination of factors is primarily responsible.

In a recent Public Interest article, Richard B. Freeman and Harry J. Holzer summarize "what we know" about black youth unemployment by "sort[ing] out the contributing factors and . . . evaluat[ing] the relative importance of each" (1985, p. 23). Their conclusions are drawn from a 1979-80 survey conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) of inner-city minority youths in Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia. The authors consider the NBER survey results especially relevant and revealing because the youths interviewed "are much more likely to be unemployed and less likely to be employed than white youth or all black youth" (1985, p. 21).

Among the demand-side influences which contribute to disproportionate black youth labor market distress, Freeman and Holzer convincingly discount the extent to which the economy's alleged weak performance, an artificially high black youth wage rate, or the exodus of jobs from urban areas can account for persistently high black youth unemployment. As evidence of the national economy's relatively strong job-creating capacity, the authors cite the employment of 22 million new workers between 1970 and 1983, "in spite of relatively sluggish economic growth" (1983, p. 24). However, only one-tenth of one percent of those new workers were black youth, indicating that even under conditions of significant employment growth, black youth employment gains are marginal at best.

With respect to a presumed increase in black youth wages due to Federal initiatives, the authors make three salient points in their dismissal of this alleged wage trend as a significant contributor to black youth joblessness. First, with regard to equal opportunity and affirmative action, the authors argue that these Federal policies are designed to "raise demand, not simply wages," and the "programs take equal pay as a given and seem to raise the

employment" of disadvantaged groups. In addition, they cite other NBER research which "finds that companies with affirmative action do indeed increase employment of protected groups more than do other companies" (1985, p. 25). Second, amid the plethora of research estimating the disemployment effects of the minimum wage, the authors confidently state:

> . . . one still cannot reasonably blame changes in the minimum wage for any rise in black youth joblessness in the 1970s, the simple reason being that the minimum wage has fallen relative to average wage rates. In 1970, the minimum wage was 50 percent of average private sector wages; by 1983 it was only 42 percent of average private sector wages. This decline in the relative value of the minimum wage would have tended to increase employment of youths over the decade (Authors' emphasis, 1985, p. 25).

The third piece of empirical evidence presented by the authors simply argues that during that period "when black youth wages rose substantially, there was no deterioration in employment" (1985, p. 25). Any one of these arguments sufficiently discredits the increased black youth wage hypothesis, and in combination they provide interesting implications for employment policy to which the paper will address itself in Section III.

Based on David Ellwood's (1983) NBER-sponsored research in Chicago, there is little, if any, evidence to support the notion that the movement of jobs from the central city to the suburbs is a major contributor to black youth unemployment. In the Chicago case, the authors prosaically conclude that the problem is "race, not space;" proximity to employment does not lead to a narrowing of the black/white unemployment gap in Chicago. Over a decade ago, Bennett Harrison (1972) found that even though some jobs were moving out of cities, blacks fared relatively less well in both the city and suburbs. Freeman and Holzer (1985) acknowledge the importance of local labor market conditions in cities, and conclude that in labor markets where the female

labor force participation is high, black youth suffer. By contrast, the size of the Hispanic population does not seem to have significant adverse effects on the employment prospects of inner-city black youth. In New York City, recent research suggests that black and Puerto Rican job-seekers rarely compete, while there seems to be a growing degree of job competition between black and more recent immigrants; especially Asians and non-Puerto Rican Hispanics (Bailey and Waldinger 1984; Department of City Planning 1985).

Assessing the extent to which racial discrimination contributes to black youth joblessness is an extremely difficult task. Studies which assert that there is less racial discrimination now than there was in some previous period, or claim, as do Freeman and Holzer, "that blatant discrimination by employers has effectively been eliminated" (1985, p. 26) confuse the existence of anti-discrimination laws and social policies with their effectiveness. Unfortunately, the fact that it is now against the law and more difficult to discriminate in no way guarantees that racial discrimination will not take place.

On the supply-side, Freeman and Holzer focus their attention on youth attitudes and work aspirations. They conclude that "good attitudes" are better than "bad attitudes" and that the development of "positive attitudes toward work can help reduce the black youth joblessness problem." It is not clear, however, that "positive attitudes toward work" can be developed independently of positive employment experiences. The authors cite the importance of "high wages and high job status" and job security in stemming absenteeism which suggests that having a good job is paramount to developing positive work attitudes.

Datcher-Loury and Loury (1983) find that "some measures of attitudes, values, and beliefs are. . . important determinants of labor supply" in their survey of young urban minority males. Freeman (1983) reaches similar conclusions in his contribution to the NBER survey research, and, in particular, finds that church-going and other variables that may be interpreted as indicators of work attitudes can be significantly associated with school attendance, work, and particpation in crime and deviant activities. In a recent Joint Center for Political Studies publication entitled "Minorities and the Labor Market: Twenty Years of Misguided Policy," McGahey and Jeffries suggest that inferences about behavior based upon attitudinal batteries should be made with caution:

> Much of the attitude research is confounded by the crude measures available, and the problem that what people say about their attitudes may not reflect their behavior. For instance, Sadd, Kotkin and Friedman (1983), in an evaluation of labor market program impacts on poor urban teenagers with substantial criminal justice involvement, report no significant correlations between a variety of attitude measures and labor market outcome. They stress that some of the standardized scales provided for this Labor Department-sponsored program 'appeared to lack face validity, and many did not seem appropriate to this population' (1985, p. 17).

The major problem with attributing a significant amount of explanatory power to attitudes is that attitudes are not likely to be changed by public policy. For example, consider Freeman's focus on church-going as "a significant factor" in "increasing employment"--does this imply that public policy should concentrate on providing black youth with incentives to go to church? Probably not, but Freeman's emphasis on such attitudes does not evoke a clear direction for youth employment policy.

III. YOUTH EMPLOYMENT POLICY: THE MULTI-PROGRAM APPROACH

Young people who are likely to experience difficulty or be unsuccessful in the labor market are the obvious targets of youth employment policy. But the degree to which different groups of economically disadvantaged youth are at risk varies considerably. Therefore, the development of a comprehensive youth employment policy must involve each of the following: (a) the design of programs created to meet the varying needs of a heterogeneous economically-disadvantaged youth population; (b) ample financial support from Federal, state, and local administrations; and (c) a pre-conceived state and/or local strategy designed to ensure that local programs and related municipal service providers are well coordinated, overlap where appropriate, and are flexible enough to accommodate changing local economic conditions.

Who Needs Help and What Can Programs Realistically Do?

Because a lessening of the youth employment problem is not likely to come from the projected decline of the youth population, it is important that policy makers have a clear idea of what determines the neediness of different groups. Dividing the universe of youth in need into groups is a useful way to define specific program goals. One of the first distinctions to be made is whether the economically disadvantaged youth are in or out of school. Although both groups are in need of assistance, they may face different types of barriers to the labor market, implying that the assistance provided should vary accordingly.

The in-school group includes graduating high school seniors, those enrolled in postsecondary institutions, and those still completing their

secondary school education. Among the graduating high school seniors, several useful distinctions are appropriate if their varying needs are to be addressed. High school graduates from economically disadvantaged households and families who plan to pursue a college education are in desperate need of financial support. Presumably these individuals have performed well in high school and at least satisfactorily on college-entrance examinations, and therefore are deserving potential undergraduates.

Financial aid to low-income students can be provided in many forms. At the Federal level, a commitment or re-commitment to low-income student access to higher education would require an expansion of educational opportunity grants, and other federally sponsored college-based aid programs. According to the Educational Amendments of 1972, the means-tested Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (BEOG) program was designed explicitly to provide low-income students with financial aid, and was considered "the foundation [of] other federal student assistance programs" (Government Printing Office 1972). Over time, however, it has become apparent that the federal grant only provides access to whatever that specific amount of money will buy. For the 1985 fall semester, the maximum grant is $2,100 under the Pell Grant program. In the face of rising college costs, it is not at all clear that the Pell Grant program at current levels can by itself increase low-income student access to higher education.

State assistance to students pursuing undergraduate degrees is also important. In addition to offering low-interest loans, the expansion of state scholarship programs to undergraduate institutions is essential. But given the diversity of private and public institutions, state scholarship funds must be distributed between the private and public higher education sectors in a

way that does not jettison or compromise the state's commitment to increasing low-income student access to higher education. At the same time, state and federal student assistance programs have to be coordinated such that institutions of higher education are rewarded for using programs in combinations which most effectively increase low-income student access to higher education.

State and local programs must also be innovative. For example, New York City's Police Department has proposed a program which will offer undergraduates tuition assistance in exchange for their service as police department employees after they have graduated from college. Although the program is not targeted to low-income students explicitly, it is an example of a program which is likely to attract many students who are seeking ways to finance their undergraduate studies, and, at the same time, directly benefit the locality.

The coordination and proliferation of federal, state, and local student financial assistance programs should be seen as an integral part of a youth employment policy. No young person should be denied an undergraduate education solely because his or her economic circumstances dictate that he or she cannot afford to pay.*

A second group of graduating high school seniors is comprised of those students who plan to pursue postsecondary education, but at two-year community colleges or other noncollegiate postsecondary institutions. In addition to financial assistance, it is important that these students are provided sound

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* Issues related to the quality of instruction in private and public colleges are beyond the scope of this paper. Although the author is clearly concerned about low-income student access to higher education, I do not mean to imply that "open enrollment" is the solution to the problems of college-ready youth. Nor am I suggesting that the quality of instruction once enrolled is of marginal importance, especially in public two-year and four-year institutions where minority students constitute the majority of enrollees or are otherwise heavily concentrated.

advice regarding the appropriate balance of general liberal arts and occupational education in two-year schools. Many authors have suggested that community colleges and occupational curricula within two year colleges are used to lock low-income students into areas of study to which eventual labor market returns are either very low or non-existent. Others caution that because private proprietary trade schools rely almost totally on tuition for their operation they recruit low-income students and then encourage them to take federal and state loans which pay for tuition costs. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has found that many of these schools do very little for their students as far as adequate occupational training and education is concerned. The consequence is that low-income students finish or leave these private trade schools with no marketable skills and no means with which they can pay their debts to the U.S. Office of Education. The FTC has also found that a large proportion of defaulted federal student loans are from students who attended postsecondary noncollegiate training schools. More often than not, it is uninformed or misinformed students who are easily taken advantage of. Those students who typically pursue postsecondary occupational education at private trade schools would benefit greatly from federal and state regulation of the trade school industry. Locally, an active New York City Department of Consumer Affairs could initiate suits against trade schools that engage in false advertising in the subway cars. As consumers, students are entitled to federal, state and local protection.

The remaining two groups of graduating high school seniors are more traditional targets of youth employment policy: those who graduate with low-level basic skills and those who graduate with acceptable basic skills but with little or no work experience. Numerous surveys indicate that employers

prefer to hire high school graduates rather than high school dropouts. At the same time, however, there is a growing concern among educators across the country that a high school diploma has become nothing more than an "attendance certificate" for an increasing number of graduating students. Our justifiable preoccupation with high school dropouts and astronomically high dropout rates has overshadowed the fact that a greater percentage of the population is graduating from high school now than ever before, at a time when youth unemployment is also increasing. Some critics have suggested that it is precisely because "everyone" is receiving a high school diploma that the failure to do so, i.e., dropping out, indicates a level of competence and/or attitude that is totally unacceptable in the world of work. Others suggest that high school diplomas must be differentiated in order to distinguish between students who have been diligent and have merely "hung in there," from those who have excelled academically. If the high school diploma has in fact become an increasingly ambiguous credential, high school graduates who plan to enter the labor market will need varying types of assistance.

For those graduating seniors who are reading at grade level but have little work experience, a program that focuses on placing participants in a good entry-level job is most appropriate. Work experience is the key for this particular group, and no amount of classroom training or out-of-the-workplace "orientation to the world of work" can substitute for or be more valuable than actually having a job. What this group needs most is to acquire general on-the-job skills and positive attitudes toward work that they can market in the future. Reliable employees who complete job tasks, are easily supervised, and who require little supervision after job tasks have been assigned are valued highly by employers. These attributes are best acquired while employed

in a decent entry-level job. Private and public sector job development would be an essential component of this type of program.

High school graduates who have poor basic reading and/or computational skills are likely to benefit most from a program which combines regular part-time employment with remedial education. In addition to work experience, this group needs classroom instruction geared toward improving basic skills and tied to the eventual placement of participants into full-time regular employment. Job development would be a critical component of this type of program because the program would have to find part-time jobs requiring very low skill levels and then identify jobs employees could move into after their basic skills were improved. Rather than perceive the necessity for low-level part-time employment as an added burden to the program, that component should be seen as an opportunity for linking community economic development with youth employment policy. Focusing on the development or re-establishment of part-time jobs within economically-depressed local communities serves a dual purpose: part-time employment for program participants, and the revitalization of small community-servicing enterprises within participants' neighborhoods.

Youth employment programs aimed at in-school youth should be designed, first and foremost, to keep young people in school. These programs must effectively prevent economically-disadvantaged enrollees from having to choose between school and income; therefore, employment while attending school is a crucial feature of this particular initiative. The New York City Board of Education's Cooperative Education Program is an example of such an approach. Having a summer job is an important component for this type of program, providing the student guarantees that he or she returns to school in the fall.

For the purposes of deciding which services are most appropriate for out-of-school youth, it is useful to partition that group by age and reading level. According to a City University of New York newsletter, "there are over one million people in New York City eighteen years of age or older with less than eight years of education" (City University of New York 1985, p. 9). For those young people under 18 years old who are reading below the seventh or eighth grade, youth employment policy must give them the incentive to either return to school or complete a high school equivalency examination outside of school. Combining work experience with GED preparation is also a productive approach for this group. The program should also offer part-time summer employment (combined with basic skills or GED instruction) that will turn into regular part-time employment in the fall provided the out-of-school youth in this group return to school immediately following the summer.

For young people who are over 18 years of age and have basic skill deficiencies, programs must prepare to offer GED preparation in alternative school settings, English as a Second Language courses, and some kind of employment, even if it is menial. This is especially necessary for those young adults who have family responsibilities and are in the job market to contribute income to the household. Young adults who have more acceptable levels of basic skills despite the fact that they have dropped out of school are in need of GED preparation and alternative adult education designed to better prepare them for job searches.

Of course there are special groups of youths who must be explicitly integrated into a youth employment policy--the two most striking examples being teenage mothers and fathers and foster teens.

I have deliberately omitted references to job or occupation-specific skills training for youth and wage strategies, especially a subminimum wage or wage subsidies to employers, because they have been overemphasized in the past. With respect to occupation-specific training, evaluations of youth employment and training programs show a positive effect on the post-program earnings of participants, as compared to similar youth who did not participate in the program. However, the research also shows that those programs have no long-term effect on the young person's future employability. Consequently, training of that sort does little to help the most disadvantaged participants. Program research and employer surveys reveal that wage subsidies have an impact only after the required paper-work has been minimized and the employer has already been convinced that the potential young employee has "the proper attitude toward work." A subminimum wage for youth as the cornerstone of youth employment policy only makes sense if it can be shown that the minimum wage is the major contributor to the youth employment problem. As mentioned earlier in Section II, no empirical evidence supports that conclusion. Research on the effects of a subminimum wage show that although a subminimum wage is associated with marginal increases in youth employment, it will not reduce the youth unemployment rate nor will it necessarily induce employers to hire disadvantaged minority youth in particular. In addition, the costs associated with a reduction of the minimum wage are likely to be borne by adult low-wage and part-time workers and chronically unemployed black youth.

Many individual programs in New York City currently offer some of the services suggested above (see Tapper, 1983 and Schilit, 1983). But a comprehensive youth employment policy must recognize the diversity of the

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universe in need, and carefully knit together what might otherwise be a plethora of independent programs serving different types of youngsters. Two major themes are at the heart of the program outlined above: 1) improving basic reading and mathematical skill levels where they are deficient (often referred to as "competency based training"); and 2) providing youth with positive employment experiences, not career strategies. A public school system which effectively minimized dropout rates, especially among minorities and the economically disadvantaged, and was held accountable such that students graduating read at least at grade level could lead to an eventual de-emphasizing of the first theme. But until such time, pressure on our local public school system to function responsibly must also be recognized as an integral and necessary part of a comprehensive youth employment strategy. The objectives of the comprehensive policy are to expose youth to decent jobs, and keep them in school--not "stabilize" young people in the labor market. And whenever possible, that positive exposure should take place within their own communities through linkages with city and state economic development strategies. These objectives cannot be met without a firm commitment to and enforcement of anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies. Equally important are federal, state and local employment and economic development policies which result in an increasing number of employed minority <u>adults</u> to which economically disadvantaged youth can look for advice and from which employment networks can be passed along and shared.

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